Verify the image signature
The signature is keyless, made by the release workflow’s GitHub OIDC identity. Verify against that identity and issuer:ghcr.io/tai42ai/tai:1.6.33. A missing or mismatched signature exits
non-zero.
The signature is attached to the manifest-list digest, not to a tag. cosign
resolves the tag to that digest before it checks, so verifying a moving tag
(
latest, X.Y) checks whatever image the tag currently points at.Pin by digest
A tag can be re-pointed; a digest cannot. Read the current manifest-list digest and run that exact reference:TAI_VERSION in .env
linux/amd64 and linux/arm64;
imagetools inspect with no --format lists the per-arch entries.
Read which e2e suite passed
Each release runs the platform’s end-to-end suite against the image it is about to push, on every architecture, and publishes nothing unless the suite passes. The image records that suite’s release tag in itsai.tai42.e2e.ref label, next to the
org.opencontainers.image.* labels. Read it without pulling:
SBOM and provenance
The build attaches SBOM and provenance attestations to the image in-registry, and each GitHub Release carries a CycloneDX SBOM (sbom.cdx.json) for the
released multi-arch image. Use them to feed a vulnerability scanner or a
supply-chain policy.

